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A look at the activities of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, from its inception in
1927 to 1944, with regard to licensing hotel beverage rooms in the Niagara region
would indicate that the LCBO did not fully achieve its intended goal of rationalizing
the public consumption of liquor. The Liquor Control Act was based on implicit and
general concepts derived from the pre-prohibition concern over the morally suspect
world of the saloon. Although the LCBO had been established as an objective
bureaucracy, its officials, when inspecting hotels and enforcing the rules of the act,
employed a language that demonstrated the persistence of the pre-prohibition value
system of middle-class temperance reformers. Nevertheless, elements of the LCBO’s
activity illustrate clear attempts to move away from the pre-prohibition system of
patronage towards something that resembled, at least structurally, the ideal, typical
bureaucracy.
Il semblerait que la Régie des alcools de l’Ontario n’ait pas totalement réussi, par
ses activités d’octroi de permis aux bars des hôtels de la région du Niagara, à
freiner la consommation publique d’alcool entre 1927, au moment de sa création, et
1944. La Loi sur les alcools de l’époque se fondait sur la notion largement répandue
d’avant la prohibition voulant qu’un bar soit un endroit moralement suspect. Si la
Régie est née à des fins objectivement bureaucratiques, ses agents, lorsqu’ils
inspectaient les hôtels et faisaient respecter la règle de la loi, employaient un lan-
gage témoignant de la persistance des valeurs que préconisaient les adeptes de la
Tempérance de la classe moyenne avant la Prohibition. Toutefois, si l’on en juge par
une partie de ses activités, la RAO a clairement tenté de se dissocier du système de
favoritisme d’avant la Prohibition pour adopter un système ressemblant davantage,
du moins structurellement, à la bureaucratie idéale ordinaire.
IN 1927 the Ontario government ended its decade-long experiment with
liquor prohibition in favour of a tightly controlled, state-run liquor distribu-
tion and licensing system. Out of the prohibition-era Ontario Temperance Act,
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the province constructed the Liquor Control Act and the body that would
enforce its rules, the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO). The LCBO
established liquor stores, regulated the distribution of beer and wine by brew-
eries and wineries, and licensed establishments where the sale and on-site
consumption of beer and wine would be permitted. This bureaucratization of
liquor control was not simply a matter of constructing an administrative struc-
ture to enforce the law. By creating this board, the Ontario government erected
a bureaucracy that attempted to bring a rational approach to liquor control in
the province. Far from being an objective system, however, the LCBO
enforced a set of moral assumptions and value judgements about the proper
site and manner of public drinking.
This ambiguous role is illustrated by the operation of the LCBO in the Nia-
gara Region, the counties of Lincoln and Welland that span the Niagara pen-
insula, from the creation of the LCBO to the end of the Second World War,
when liquor policies changed significantly.1 The several hundred records of
Standard Hotel License applications and Establishment Files reveal the rela-
tionship between enforcers and enforced, as well as shedding light on how
the LCBO built its authority on a foundation that, while firmly rooted in
pre-prohibition, middle-class temperance ideas, was also informed and in
some ways enhanced by a notion of the importance of the bureaucracy as a
means of enforcing social order.2 The LCBO’s criteria for granting the privi-
lege of alcohol sales were in practice subjective, even though its administra-
tors aspired towards an objective regulatory regime built on a moral authority
gained through a rational, ideal-typical bureaucracy.
Attempts to employ objectivity were restricted by two key aspects of the
enforcement mechanism. First, the Liquor Control Act and the LCBO’s own
rules were sufficiently vague as to require interpretation based upon subjec-
tive assessments of behaviour at the grass roots. These assessments came
from a variety of parties: liquor inspectors “in the field” who were agents of
the LCBO; local officials (such as municipal councillors or members of the
legislature); and members of the public whose motives were often unclear
and usually self-interested. Indeed, rather than operating as an ideal-typical,
top-down bureaucracy, the LCBO relied upon extensive local input, suggest-
ing a great degree of specific, ad hoc creation and enforcement of rules. Sec-
ondly, the main enforcers of the rules were also those with a strong personal
interest in selling liquor: the proprietors. They were granted an authority to
1 In 1944 the LCBO’s licensing role was shifted to the Liquor Authority Control Board, which was in turn
replaced by the Liquor Licensing Board of Ontario (LLBO) in 1946.
2 The data are based upon an examination of the nearly 200 records n the LCBO’s Standard Hotel Files
and the Establishment Files for the Niagara Region, that is, the counties of Welland and Lincoln in the
Niagara Peninsula in southern Ontario. The bulk of the analysis, not surprisingly, comes from the Stan-
dard Hotel Files. Most of these establishments did not meet the requirements of the Board and were
therefore either persistently problematic or denied a beer and wine authority. It is in these cases that the
nature of the LCBO’s regulatory regime may be most adequately observed.
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sell beer and wine — or, stated more precisely, the “authority” of the LCBO
to do so was extended to the proprietor. The proprietor became, in effect, an
“agent” of the LCBO. That authority could be suspended at any time, for any
number of transgressions. The authority holder’s responsibility was to ensure
that beer and wine were consumed properly, within the guidelines and expec-
tations of the LCBO. In enforcing its rules, evaluating the character and suit-
ability of the proprietor, and meting out punishments, the LCBO veered from
its ideal as an impartial, rational bureaucracy into shades of grey in dealing
with individual behaviour, by any estimation far from a rationalized system.
Post-prohibition liquor licensing regimes in Canada have received growing
but limited attention from historians. Robert Campbell has examined the
establishment of liquor control in British Columbia in the post-prohibition
period, as well as the specific issue of beer by the glass in Vancouver’s beer
parlours.3 He links these issues to the extension and perpetuation of moral
reform efforts in reaction to the persistent spectre of the pre-prohibition
saloon. His study of Vancouver’s parlours, the interplay between regulator
and regulated, and how they shaped the development of the regulatory regime
provides an informative exploration of the give-and-take of the moral regula-
tion framework. Yet, within this work, the bureaucratic process remains
something of a “black box”. In his monumental study of drinking in Canada,
Craig Heron evaluates the shift in priorities from the moral regulation of
pre-prohibition regimes to the efforts to restrict access to alcoholic beverages
and “to educate the drinker in moderation”.4 He argues that the new legal
regime set boundaries for drinking cultures that would last for at least the next
half-century.5 Mariana Valverde’s work on licensing is a chapter of a broader
study of drunkenness and drinking. She argues that, while liquor control sys-
tems “are bizarre from the point of view of law and downright ridiculous from
the point of view of biomedicine ... the minor practices of governing have
their own ‘minor’ logics”, which are worth studying in their own right.6 One
limitation to the impressive work of both Heron and Valverde is the very
nature of the general overview they provide.7 While useful as surveys, these
studies offer limited applicability for interpreting the activity of the LCBO’s
enforcement mechanism, which was based upon activity at the local level.
3 Respectively, Robert Campbell, Demon Rum or Easy Money? Government Control of Liquor in British
Columbia from Prohibition to Privatization (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991), and Sit Down
and Drink Your Beer: Regulating Vancouver’s Beer Parlours, 1925–1954 (Toronto: University of Tor-
onto Press, 2001).
4 Craig Heron, Booze: A Distilled History (Toronto: Between the Lines Press, 2003), p. 227.
5 Ibid., p. 295.
6 Mariana Valverde, Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), p. 148.
7 Heron’s work is an excellent synthesis of broad trends, and the section on provincial liquor regulations
offers valuable comparisons. But it is limited by the general nature these comparisons require. Val-
verde offers generalizations based upon what would seem to be a narrow readng of the LCBO’s regula-
tory activities.
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The current study, and the broader project from which it emerges, is based
upon the assertion that the activity of the LCBO at the “macro” level cannot
be understood without an analysis of the pressures placed upon it at the micro
level.
Valverde suggests that the best way to understand the regulation of con-
sumption “would be to study the horizontal linkages that create partly chosen
and partly habitual assemblages of regulatory practices” formed out of admin-
istrative tendency and precedence.8 This is certainly one valid way of describ-
ing the creation of the LCBO, which emerged from the Board of License
Commissioners of Ontario, whose role was to oversee the operation of the
Ontario Temperance Act. While it may have been the result of “institutional
habit”, however, habits change. The LCBO was also the manifestation of a
bureaucratization of liquor regulation: an attempt to break from past struc-
tures that had caused problems. Valverde acknowledges, as do Heron and
Campbell, that the saloon was the “folk devil” of liquor regulation that needed
to be exorcized from the landscape.9 To do so, the government established the
LCBO as a bureaucracy that attempted to rationalize the system of liquor reg-
ulation and break not only from the spectre of the saloon, but from the previ-
ous practices of local influence and patronage and the corruption they
engendered. What persisted, I argue, were the pre-prohibition, middle-class
temperance values, modified to suit the new bureaucratic reality of a system
that urged moderation rather than abstinence.
In contrast to the dearth of research on liquor licensing, bureaucratization
has been an issue of ongoing debate and modification since Max Weber’s
works became available in the English language. Rather than add to the the-
oretical debates within sociological circles, I seek to employ insights provided
by the concept and conceptualization of bureaucracies to understand the
development of the LCBO as a specific type of bureaucracy. While bureau-
cratization itself has received much theoretical exploration, the process of
bureaucratization in liquor licensing has had little if any attention, and the
application of theories of bureaucratization to the provincial context in
Ontario is also meagre.10 A brief outline of the way in which I use the term
“bureaucratization” is useful here as a way to avoid theoretical confusion.
As Weber conceived it, bureaucratization is one of two processes (the other
being capitalism) of rationalizing and secularizing systems in the modern
world. Bureaucratization includes written, impersonal rules and regulations,
8 Valverde, Diseases of the Will, p. 146.
9 Ibid., pp. 153–160; Heron, Booze, pp. 281–283; Campbell, Demon Rum, pp. 16–17.
10 To be sure, there are many studies of various bureaucratic developments in Ontario and in Canada,
but they generally use only the terminology, not the theoretical approach, of Weber (at least not bla-
tantly). One exception is J. E. Hodgetts, From Arm’s Length to Hands-on: The Formative Years of
Ontario’s Public Service, 1867–1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), in which the
author mentions that from 1905 to 1940 “practically all of the main elements of a rationalized bureau-
cracy ... considered by ... Max Weber to be the criterion of modern statehood, emerged” (p. 233).
Standard Hotel Licensing in Niagara, 1927–1944 63
the division of labour, the specialization and permanence of officials’ posi-
tions, centralization of power over these positions, and the decentralization of
specified authority.11 It replaced prior systems of patronage or subjective rule
enforcement with “ ‘rationalized’ principles, typically intentionally estab-
lished, [which] ... apply to a specific delimited range of phenomena”.12 Offi-
cials relate to superiors and subordinates within a reality defined by the
parameters of the bureaucracy. In effect, that bureaucracy is the cause and
effect of the rules, or the need for rationalization in society. In his “Bureau-
cracy as Belief”, Richard Hilbert goes one step further, arguing that, while the
bureaucracy may never reach the ideal-type that Weber had imagined, the con-
cept of the bureaucracy may be better understood as a structure that creates
“ideas about bureaucracy, a spirit of bureaucracy, a bureaucratic mentality”.13
For the LCBO, this concept of rationalization of systems and rules, and a
subsequent internalization of the bureaucratic mentality, can be seen in the
case of Niagara. Tasks and responsibilities were parcelled out to certain actors
or “agents”, including the authority holder. These regulations represented
attempts to rationalize a system of drinking laws, a process hindered by dis-
parate enforcement regimes and local political cultures. Officials attempted to
negotiate the various, often competing, local interests while defending their
Board’s authority as a bureaucracy that was supposed to be immune from the
pressures of local politics. To enforce their version of moral and social order,
they needed to present an image of the ideal-typical, rational bureaucracy.
Ontario’s Liquor Control Act created a government monopoly over the sale
of liquor through the LCBO and permitted the sale of light beer, 4.4 per cent
proof spirit, at licensed establishments. The legal age for purchasing and con-
suming alcohol was 21 years. The Board established liquor stores throughout
the province, at which stronger beer, wine, and spirits were available to hold-
ers of a liquor permit. The act was modified in 1934, immediately before a
provincial election, in a move designed simply to win the governing Conser-
vatives another mandate. The Conservatives lost, and the newly elected Lib-
erals, who had been critical of the original LCA, began governing with a
significantly expanded liquor law. The 1934 act, also known as the “beer-sale
bill”, legalized sales of stronger beer by the glass at Standard Hotel dining
rooms and beverage rooms, on steamships and trains, and in private and vet-
erans’ clubs. Until the 1940s, “light” beer could be sold elsewhere, depend-
11 Wolfgang Mommsen, “Max Weber on Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization: Threat to Liberty and Instru-
ment of Creative Action”, in Mommsen, ed., The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 109–120; Christopher Dandeker, “Patronage and Bureaucratic
Control: The Case of the Naval Officer in English Society, 1780–1850”, British Journal of Sociology,
vol. 29, no. 3 (September 1978), p. 300; Marshall W. Meyer and M. Craig Brown, “The Process of
Bureaucratization”, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 83, no. 2 (September 1977), pp. 365–366.
12 Dandeker, “Patronage and Bureaucratic Control”, p. 300.
13 Richard A. Hilbert, “Bureaucracy as Belief, Rationalization as Repair: Max Weber in a Post-function-
alist Age”, Sociological Theory, vol. 5 (Spring 1987), p. 70.
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ing on licensure of the LCBO.14 Standard Hotel proprietors needed to apply
for an “authority” to sell beer and wine. In the next few months, the gold rush
for beer and wine authorities began, and hundreds were distributed in a very
brief period.
Early surveillance was limited by resources and personnel. To enforce the
Standard Hotel regulations, the LCBO employed inspectors who would live
in the region and visit hotels regularly, as well as whenever called upon to do
so by the Board officials in Toronto. Until the early 1930s the LCBO
employed eight inspectors for the entire province, not sufficient to investigate
all applicants, and often called upon the police to look into the character of an
establishment and its proprietor. The expansion of the scope of liquor licens-
ing in 1934 created a rush among establishments to acquire an authority and,
as a result, the LCBO licensed establishments that, upon closer inspection,
were unsuitable. Moreover, what the police saw as suitable and what inspec-
tors were looking for appear to have differed. After 1934, on a number of
occasions, inspectors recommended against renewing an authority and com-
mented that the authority had been granted in error after the establishment
had been inspected by police, without sufficient scrutiny by an LCBO inspec-
tor. This situation caused considerable frustration, both for proprietors who
had become accustomed to their authority and for LCBO bureaucrats who
had to deal with the repercussions of an apparently uneven administration of
regulations. In 1934 and soon afterwards, several proprietors of restaurants
attempted either to call themselves “Standard Hotels” and apply for such a
designation or to undertake a cheap renovation, putting in a few rooms and
continuing with business as usual. These establishments rarely received a
renewed authority, but the decision entailed considerable confusion for all
involved.
Inspectors considered a variety of factors when evaluating an establish-
ment and the proprietor’s suitability for an authority. They looked at the
physical layout, from the size and functionality of the beverage and dining
rooms to the number and quality of bedrooms, as well as the location and
suitability of toilets and other amenities. Apart from examining the simple
physical layout and nature of the business, inspectors spent a great deal of
effort scrutinizing less tangible factors of the establishment. They considered
the character, reputation, and behaviour of proprietors. They looked at the
part of town in which the hotel was located: was it in an area where it would
function as a hotel — that is, near the business district — or in an area that
would make it conducive to operating simply as a beverage room? They
might also contact the police and local officials to determine the reputation of
the establishment and its clientele, and even considered past uses of the
establishment. These intangible criteria suggest that the LCBO sought to
enforce the rules based upon an unstated set of value expectations: modera-
14 Toronto Globe, March 2, 1934.
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tion, industry, individual self-reliance, and a heterosexual puritanism that I
will call family-centred values, such as the welfare of the family, protection
of children, and absence of sexual misconduct.
The Liquor Control Act was designed to battle the mythical folk devil of
the pre-prohibition saloon by outlining a series of behavioural norms
expected of licensed establishments and their proprietors. The act prohibited
holders of liquor licences from allowing “drunkenness or any violent, quar-
relsome, riotous or disorderly conduct to take place upon the premises desig-
nated in the permit”. It furthermore prohibited the sale of beer “to any
drunken person” and considered it an offence if the licence holder “permits or
suffers any drunken person to consume any ... beer on such premises, or per-
mits and suffers persons of notoriously bad character to assemble or meet on
such premises or suffers any gambling or any unlawful game to be carried
on”.15 A year after the act had passed, an order-in-council prohibited the
holder of a Standard Hotel License from permitting “drunkards, gamblers or
idlers to frequent or be upon his hotel premises, or allow[ing] gambling,
games of chance for gain, profane language or indecent language or other
unseemly conduct therein”. A Standard Hotel License could be issued only to
“a person of good character”. Where the hotel owner was not in charge, the
manager “shall be a person satisfactory to the Board”.16
The act was necessarily vague, and in its first years the LCBO became more
specific in expressing a perception of its mandate that rested upon pre-prohi-
bition temperance values, modified to include the central role of the bureau-
cracy to enforce notions of individual self-control.17 The Board explained that
its work encouraged “a real stimulation to temperance in all things by educa-
tion and home training rather than by prohibiting which does not prohibit”.18
Prohibition had failed because it interfered too closely with individuality.
Instead, “[M]oral advance and the personal acceptance of voluntary limita-
15 Statutes of Ontario, 17 Geo. V, cap. 70, sec. 71 (1).
16 Ontario Gazette, vol. 61, no. 31, August 4, 1928, p. 1202.
17 For examples of pre-prohibition middle-class temperance values, see Cheryl Krasnick Warsh, “Oh
Lord Pour a Cordial in her Wounded Heart: The Drinking Woman in Victorian and Edwardian Can-
ada”, in Warsh, ed., Drink in Canada: Historical Essays (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1993), pp. 70–91; Daniel J. Malleck, “Priorities of Development in Four Local
Woman’s Christian Temperance Unions in Ontario, 1877–1895”, in Jack S. Blocker Jr. and Cheryl
Krasnick Warsh, eds., The Changing Face of Drink: Substance, Imagery, and Behaviour (Ottawa: Les
Publications Histoire sociale/Social History, 1997), pp. 189–209; James L. Sturgis, “The Spectre of a
Drunkard’s Grave: One Family’s Battle with Alcohol in Late Nineteenth-Century Canada”, in Warsh,
ed., Drink in Canada, pp. 115–143; Katherine Chauvigny, “Reforming Drunkards in Nineteenth-Cen-
tury America: Religion, Medicine, Therapy”, in Sarah Tracy and Caroline Jean Acker, eds., Altering
American Consciousness: The History of Alcohol and Drug Use in America, 1800–2000 (Amherst
and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2004), pp. 108–123; Jack S. Blocker Jr., American
Temperance Movements: Cycles of Reform (Boston: Twayne Publications, 1989); Jon C. Burnham,
Bad Habits: Drinking, Smoking, Taking Drugs, Gambling, Sexual Misbehavior and Swearing in
American History (New York: New York University Press, 1993).
18 “Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, 1927”, Ontario Sessional Papers, 1928, p. 7.
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tion, if not voluntary abstinence, is the real solution of evils arising from the
abuse of intoxicating liquors.”19 The LCBO’s role was to facilitate “the teach-
ing of the principles of temperance and the advance of moderation and
self-restraint”.20 “Free people” had to be led “along moral paths”.21 Prohibi-
tion had run contrary to the values people held dear, personal capability and
individualism.
The family was at the centre of this rhetoric. In 1929 the LCBO reported
that “the work of helping those subject to the influence of liquor consists in
the handling of individuals and solving the difficulties of the family”.22
Arnold Smith, Deputy Chief Commissioner through most of the 1930s,
reminded one of the inspectors in 1938 that “every hotel-keeper should do all
he can to help out in conditions existing in families in reference to drink”.23
Here Smith reminded the inspector that the hotel proprietor, as an agent of the
Board, had a responsibility as well as a right in the selling of beer. This focus
on the family continued into the 1940s. In its report of 1941, for example, the
Board noted that purchasing privileges “should be denied in cases where
liquor has been abused ... or bought at the expense of the home. Liquor
should be purchased long after, and a long way after, the necessities of life.”24
Individual responsibility and capacity as well as the integrity of the tradi-
tional family, central concerns of the pre-prohibition temperance movement,
persisted in the post-prohibition era of liquor regulation.
The LCBO inspectors enforced this value system by considering whether a
licensee would break the rules or by observing and reporting on incidents of
drunkenness and other immoderate behaviour after a licence had been
granted. In 1933 Chief Inspector John Pitt refused to recommend the applica-
tion for an authority by the Hillcrest Inn in Niagara Falls, “owing to the local-
ity ... and of late years [it] has been used for nothing else but bootlegging
purposes. The last one to apply for a license ... is serving six months for boot-
legging.”25 Pitt was also suspicious of Louis Sacco, owner of the Victoria Inn
in Niagara Falls, not so much owing to Sacco’s own reputation, but because
“his sons and relatives ... do not bear a very good reputation”.26 Sacco’s neph-
ews, a police report later revealed, had served time in New York State for
illicit liquor dealings and manslaughter.27 In 1935 Inspector Wilson Wylie
voiced similar concern with the reputation of an applicant, noting that the
proprietor of the Lakeside Hotel in Fort Erie “has some convictions against
19 “Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, 1928”, Ontario Sessional Papers, 1929, p. 6.
20 Ibid.
21 “Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, 1929”, Ontario Sessional Papers, 1930, p. 11.
22 Ibid.
23 Archives of Ontario, LCBO Records [hereafter AO/LCBO], RG 36–8 (Empire Hotel file), Smith to
Wylie, August 26, 1938.
24 “Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, 1941”, Ontario Sessional Papers, 1942, p. 12.
25 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–723, Inspector’s Report, May 8, 1933.
26 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–710, Inspector’s Report, May 26, 1932.
27 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–738, Police Report, August 6, 1936.
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him in connection with bootlegging activities and therefore that he is the type
that in all probability would court trouble”.28
Once a licence had been granted, insistence upon moderation continued. In
1927 Inspector Dingman cited a police report that described the proprietor of
the New Stadtler Inn in St. Catharines as “quite a heavy drinker and for a time
was head of the Canadian Legion Club where liquor was dispensed very
freely. The local police have been on the alert, since [the proprietor] took over
the hotel.”29 Dingman similarly described the proprietor of the Mansion
House in Grimsby as “drunk a great deal and indeed there is suspicion of his
trafficking in liquor”.30 Inspector Pitt used quaintly dispassionate language
when describing a scene in 1934 to argue against the renewal of an authority
for the Hillcrest Inn:
When Inspecting, [I] found four men badly under the influence of liquor being
served beer and consuming same and had on table a bottle of hard liquor.... In
advising licensee of the seriousness of offence [I] had violence offered me by
the four patrons and when requested to leave premises [they] threatened to
smash windows.31
Pitt stated that reliable citizens, including the mayor, had described the hotel
as “a menace to the public”. Soon afterward, the proprietor was replaced by a
new manager who was unable to renew the liquor authority.
Moderation was linked intrinsically to ideas of industriousness. Since pro-
prietors were, in essence, agents of the LCBO, inspectors sought to ensure
that, once an authority was granted, the establishment was conducted in a
manner suitable to the Board’s standards. As the Depression of the 1930s
began, the LCBO strictly surveyed activity in the hotels to ensure that ideals
of industriousness were not violated. In its reports to the legislature, the
LCBO noted that it worked with numerous social service agencies to ensure
that people “on relief” were not using their resources to purchase alcohol.32
Several times inspectors observed cryptically that a hotel catered to people
“on relief”. For example, in the Authority Holder’s Conduct Report for the
New Arlington Hotel in October 1934, Pitt observed that the mayor of Nia-
gara Falls had said the hotel was unsuitable for an authority “on grounds that
the owner serves men with beer who are on city relief”.33 In 1938 Mrs. M.
wrote to the LCBO concerned that her husband, who had been unemployed,
was working at the Royal Oak Hotel in Niagara Falls, but not being paid, or
28 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–1509, Inspector’s Report, August 15, 1935.
29 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–616, W. B. Elliott (constable) to Dingman, n.d. [ca. December 20, 1927].
30 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–613, Dingman to Smith, December 31, 1927.
31 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–723, Authority Holder’s Conduct Report [hereafter AHCR], October 10,
1934.
32 “Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, 1930”, Ontario Sessional Papers, 1931.
33 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–719, AHCR, October 8, 1934.
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at least not sending her money. The LCBO responded with a series of terse
letters to the hotel proprietor, learning that the man had been working for
room and board and that his wife’s letter was part of a broader problem within
a fractured family.
The undesired link between unemployment and beverage rooms was
reflected in letters from the public. Writing “in the interest of innocent chil-
dren”, in 1938 a Port Dalhousie resident protested a licence application. She
begged the Board to take into account that “the nearby residences are mainly
occupied by either part-time or whole-time relief recipients who have small
children who would suffer the want of food were temptation thus put right at
the doors of parents already discouraged by unemployment, who would use
this means of numbing their sensibilities”.34 This writer’s sentiments were
repeated by others and drew upon the typical temperance notions of liquor
destroying the family, undermining industriousness, and causing social havoc.
In the Board’s consideration of issues of industriousness, concern over
sales to people on relief was one side of the coin; the other was the expectation
that the proprietor would himself set a good example. The LCBO frowned
upon authority holders who could not pay their bills. Like the exploitation of
workers or the facilitation of marital discord, this was behaviour unbecoming
to an authority holder of the Board. While not relating in any way to the con-
duct of patrons or the sale of liquor, the concern over indebtedness, relating as
it did to the proprietor’s character and industriousness, was held against cer-
tain proprietors. The Board was contacted by coal companies, insurance com-
panies, and private individuals over the debts of Standard Hotel License
holders. Writing to a proprietor regarding one such letter, Smith argued,
“[W]hile we do not in any way intend to act as a collection agency, I am bring-
ing the matter to your attention because it does not seem proper procedure that
hotels holding Authorities from this Board should be so delinquent in the pay-
ment of their accounts.”35 Here and elsewhere, the privilege of holding an
authority to sell liquor was used as a coercive tool to insist upon a standard of
behaviour that far exceeded the scope of sales of liquor to the public.36
The idea of industriousness and self-sufficiency was also used by propri-
etors to argue for their privilege to hold a beverage authority. In 1934, soon
after the legislation changed, David Tressider, proprietor of the Hillcrest Inn,
noted that his family would suffer if he lost his authority, since he would be
forced to close and “will only have my Army pension to support my wife and
six children”.37 His reference to his military service may have been an under-
stated attempt at leniency, since, in the decades after the First World War, the
34 AO/LCBO, RG 36–8 (Embassy Hotel, Port Dalhousie), letter to LCBO, November 27, 1938.
35 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–713, Smith to Mr. R. Reinhard, April 21, 1943.
36 See also cases such as AO/LCBO, RG 36–8 (Esquire Hotel, St. Catharines), Smith to Garbutt, Octo-
ber 6, 1936; AO/LCBO, RG 36–8 (Grand Trunk Hotel, Fort Erie), Smith to Melappioni, August 31,
1935.
37 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–723, David Tressider to Odette, July 20, 1934.
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government was concerned to ensure that former soldiers and their families
were employed.38 In 1937, when Louis Sacco’s authority for the Victorian Inn
in Niagara Falls was not renewed, Sacco’s priest wrote to William Houck, the
local (Liberal) member of the provincial legislature, noting that Sacco “has
always been a good, respectable and industrious citizen”.39 Sacco reiterated
the appeal to industry when he wrote to Premier Hepburn, saying that not only
would he lose his property, but he would have to go on relief, “which I do not
like to do after working for forty-seven years”.40 In 1940 Mr. E. S., a resident
of Niagara Falls, wrote to Houck defending the reputation of the Royal Oak.
He argued that the manager “has a very respectable hotel and tries to live up
to the laws.... He has all respectable people patronize his Hotel.”41 The LCBO
was not generally swayed by such arguments.
These notions of industriousness, not selling to men on relief, and the
importance of a hotel having an authority so that the proprietor could con-
tinue to work often referred to an overarching issue of protecting the family.
This interest in the welfare of the family was a strong thread running through
the files of the LCBO. Some references to the family held more weight than
others. Appeals like those of Sacco and Tressider had little effect, while the
story of Mrs. M., whose husband did not send her money while he worked at
the Royal Oak Hotel, attracted considerable attention and is indicative of a
key feature of the moral standards to which the LCBO held hotel proprietors.
The Board attempted to make sure that liquor consumption had no deleteri-
ous effects on the institution of the family. Here we are talking not only of the
liquor business breaking up the family (as may have been the case with Mr.
and Mrs. M.), but also how the behaviour of proprietors and their customers
measured up to a standard of moral living — absence of sexual deviancy, dal-
liance, or philandering; protection of children; and maintenance of the sanc-
tity of the family unit. The LCBO looked unfavourably upon activities that
involved sexual matters, such as suggestions of prostitution or miscegena-
tion, and those that threatened the home, such as under-aged drinking and
philandering. While the LCBO censured hotel proprietors for permitting cer-
tain unsavoury activities to go on in their rooms, however, images of the fam-
ily were used by all sides. Proprietors and their advocates invoked the
integrity and welfare of their families to argue against Board decisions to
refuse or rescind an authority; letter writers opposing a hotel’s authority cast
aspersions on the activities of proprietors; others accused hotels of seedy
activities that were unprovable. Indeed, the family was at the centre of argu-
ments in favour of and against licensing. It was a nearly ubiquitous rhetorical
38 The opposition repeatedly asked the government how many former soldiers, family members of
former soldiers, or family members of soldiers killed in the First World War were being employed by
the LCBO. See Legislative Journals of Ontario, March 15, 1929; March 4, 1931; April 3, 1935.
39 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–738, Rev. Zazzara to Houck, April 5, 1937.
40 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–738, Sacco to Hepburn, July 22, 1937.
41 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–738, [E. S.] to Houck, n.d. [ca. October 11, 1940].
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device, but, as with the proprietors’ arguments about industriousness, it
appears to have had limited effect.
Chief among the family-centred values, and the one that garnered the most
attention by LCBO inspectors, was sexual impropriety. Eliminating it within
the environs of a licensed hotel was a central concern of the Board. When
Inspector Dean noted that the manager of one hotel had had legal action taken
against him “regarding his conduct with another man’s wife”, the LCBO
denied his application, stating that the area had enough authorities.42 One
month after Inspector Wylie noticed two different names (“F. W. Thompson
and Wife” and “F. W. Smith and wife”) on the register of Thorold’s Ormond
Hotel in the same handwriting, the hotel’s authority was suspended.43 The
authority holder who permitted such activity was not a suitable agent of the
LCBO.
The LCBO attempted, however, to be judicious, and inspectors looked
with suspicion upon anonymous or inflammatory statements. Complaints had
to come from verifiable sources. Anonymous letters complaining about sex-
ual impropriety at certain establishments were less successful in seeing those
places closed. One letter writer, “A Canadian citizen”, noted that the Royal
Oak in Niagara Falls was the site of much
desorderly [sic] conducts.... Last August during the horse race period a negro
and a white woman occupied room #14. During the day the negro had gone to
the race tracks and had brought many men down in the evening who had lined
up in the corridor and awaited their turn to get in contact with the white
woman in her room.44
Another anonymous letter complained that “minors, both boys and girls are
being served and become intoxicated and the female employee [was] being
frequently escorted to her room by some men”.45 Such letters, while denoting
the perceived potency of accusations striking at the heart of family-centred
values, did not succeed in closing the Royal Oak. Just as Sacco’s and Tres-
sider’s arguments that the loss of their authority would hurt their families had
little effect, so too did unsupportable assertions of sexual impropriety at cer-
tain hotels. In keeping with the bureaucratic ideal of standardization, the
Board followed a strict process of validation, usually sending inspectors to
interview complainants and to discuss the matter with various officials and
the proprietor.
Since the LCBO’s rational, bureaucratic structure was established to
replace a prior system characterized by uneven enforcement and patronage,
the very integrity of the new system needed to be defended. As Hilbert has
42 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–1511, Inspector’s Report, September 28, 1934.
43 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–1529, Inspector’s Report, March 3, 1937.
44 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–719, “A Canadian Citizen” to Board, February 18, 1940.
45 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–719, anonymous letter to Board, received March 11, 1940.
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noted, bureaucracy may be idealized by its proponents even before it reaches
anything resembling the “ideal-type” discussed by Weber. Convinced of the
value of such a rational system, individuals should take as their duty “to sub-
ordinate themselves to this impersonal system of rational decision making”.46
The administrators of the LCBO internalized the importance of their bureau-
cracy, recognizing that its integrity had to be maintained not just by keeping
a distance from the politicians’ desires, but also by not authorizing any estab-
lishment or proprietor that would put the LCBO’s authority into question.
Inspectors occasionally alluded to the fact that licensing a disreputable estab-
lishment would cause the Board’s image to suffer. In 1935 Arnold Smith
wrote to E. G. Odette, the recently appointed Chief Commissioner of the
Board, regarding a fuss being made over an application by the Belmont Hotel
in St. Catharines: “I am of the opinion that the Board would be severely cri-
tized [sic] if they attempt to grant an authority to premises of this nature.”47
When recommending against licensing the Italian Canadian Club in Thorold,
Inspector Dean wrote, “[I]t would be a disgrace to our Liquor Control Board
to even consider giving authority under such conditions. A thousand times
no, I would say it should not be granted.”48 Regarding his experience with a
manager whom he called “a born showman” who “does not take even himself
too seriously”, Inspector Wylie observed that “one does resent as an
employee of the Board” not being taken seriously.49 In all of these examples,
the reputation of the Board was the central concern.
A key feature of the ideal-typical bureaucracy is the filtering of rules and
systems from officials at “the top” to actors at “the bottom”; these “agents”
carry out actions that make the bureaucracy effective. The records for Nia-
gara suggest that the LCBO was caught between two bureaucractic realities.
On one hand, it sought to administer and enforce the rules evenly and fairly,
as evidenced by the rejection of anonymous complaints. On the other, the size
of the undertaking meant that the Board relied upon the input and opinion of
officials in the community, all of whom had their own agendas and interests.
Possibly harkening back to pre-prohibition times when liquor licensing was a
municipal undertaking, but also recognizing that decisions on the character
and behaviour of proprietors could not be made without additional informa-
tion from local commentators, the LCBO required considerable involvement
on the part of municipal politicians, along with local MPs and MPPs. Such
involvement reflects both a key feature of and a challenge to the structure of
a rationalized bureaucracy. A bureaucracy’s central function is to “carry out
tasks which cannot technically be performed by the employing agent itself”,
in this case the government.50 In doing so, it can devolve specific tasks to
46 Hilbert, “Bureaucracy as Belief”, p. 71.
47 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–604, Smith to Odette, August 19, 1935.
48 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–1536, Inspector’s Report, October 24, 1934.
49 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–734, AHCR, August 12, 1935.
50 Dandeker, “Patronage and Bureaucratic Control”, p. 301.
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associated parties. In this case, gathering information and opinions from
locals in positions of authority alleviated the pressure and the potentially
resource-intensive task of doing extensive background searches on each pro-
prietor. The practice entailed inherently contradictory forces, however. Since
this consultive system involved extensive input from local MPPs who were
also members of the government that operated the LCBO, the agents to
whom the LCBO parcelled out its activities were in fact representatives of the
“employing agency”. The result was often pressure from the MPPs on the
LCBO to act contrary to the ideal intent of the Liquor Control Act: in other
words, to act along the lines of patronage.
The Niagara example, however, suggests that the LCBO often resisted
such pressures. These results, examined in more detail below, challenge the
notion the LCBO was heavily involved in patronage.51 In Niagara, at least,
pleas for special favour based upon a proprietor’s political affiliation or
power in local political circles often fell on deaf ears. That is not to say that
MPPs had no influence. An endorsement from an MPP was still valuable. An
MPP’s opinion could sway the LCBO and convince its administrators to err
on the side of favouring friends of the local member, and a bad report from an
MPP could damage a proprietor’s chances of receiving an authority. But
MPPs who blatantly pressed their causes simply for the sake of their own
political survival tended to be ignored.
The expectation of patronage as the reward for an applicant’s years of
party service often appears in the letters of hotel proprietors hoping for an
authority. Frequently, when arguing against the removal or refusal of an
authority, hotel proprietors or their advocates would allude to the good work
an applicant had done in past for the Liberal Party. For example, George
MacSween of the Belmont Hotel wrote to Commissioner Odette in 1934,
soon after the Liberals formed the government, with a plea for the Board to
reconsider his rejected application. He added, “I might say by way of passing
that I have been a life-long supporter of the Liberal Party.... I have always
done my best through the long dark days.”52 When Vincent Sacco wrote to
the Premier Hepburn, appealing for help in acquiring a licence, he observed,
“I am being put out of my property by the Liberal Party for which I have
worked and supported all my life.”53 Generally these pleas were ineffective.
Similarly, local Liberal associations found their influence was limited
when attempting to urge the Board to act in their favour. For example, when
the Liberal Association of Port Colborne wrote to the LCBO, expressing con-
cern that a “rank conservative” had received an authority at that city’s Ritz
Hotel instead of the Liberal whom they had supported, the complaint had no
51 Heron, Booze, pp. 157, 174.
52 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–614, MacSween to Odette, December 22, 1934.
53 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–738, Sacco to Hepburn, July 22, 1937.
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effect on the Board’s actions.54 Likewise, the Port Dalhousie Women’s Lib-
eral Association complained that “another” hotel had been licensed in their
small town, but this appeal had no impact on the Board’s decision.55 Even
formal party affiliation had limited effect.
More significant was the direct pressure placed by members of federal or
provincial governments who were hoping to defend their political careers.
Sacco’s application was supported by William Houck, who referred to Sacco
as “a very personal friend of mine”. When Smith noted that there were other
hotels with authorities nearby, Houck admitted that “the Niagara Hotel is
practically next door but the owner of that is quite a decided opponent of mine
and naturally I am not inclined to favour him”.56 E. J. Anderson, MPP for
Thorold in 1934, wrote to Odette about an Italian applicant for an authority at
the Ormond Hotel, adding, “Mr Sarravelli is the first Liberal worker to make
an application for a license in my riding. He organized two groups of Italians
and has been to a great extent responsible for changing the town of Thorold
from a 700 Tory majority to a Liberal majority of nearly 400.”57 The mayor of
Niagara Falls included in his endorsement of the application of the proprietors
of the Cliff Hotel the observation that “his family ... have been in business
here and are large property owners and heavy tax payers and further more
have been strong Liberals through both lean and full years of the party”.58
These endorsements do not appear to have influenced the Board’s decisions;
in keeping with the ideal of the rational bureaucracy, the LCBO resisted the
political culture in which party interests were expected to hold sway.
More extreme political pressure was exerted by politicians who felt that
their political futures depended upon one individual receiving a liquor
licence. In these cases the licence became a form of political currency, but,
unfortunately for the politicians, the LCBO was not selling. Two instances of
political influence demonstrate both the persistence of the politicians and the
resilience of LCBO authorities in resisting this pressure. The first occurred
when the Marcks brothers of Hamilton applied to open a hotel in St.
Catharines. Previously, the Board had decided that there were enough author-
ities in the city and that no more would be granted. At the time of that deci-
sion in 1934, Frederick Avery was mayor and an ardent opponent to new
authorities being granted. Two years later, Avery had been elected as the Lib-
eral member of the provincial legislature and began petitioning the LCBO for
an authority for the Marcks Hotel. Inspector Wylie was “unable to understand
54 AO/LCBO, RG 36–8 (Ritz Hotel, Port Colborne), D. B. Cross to LCBO, January 26, 1935; Hugh
Clark to LCBO, February 1, 1935. See also a similar situation in AO/LCBO, RG 36–8 (Elliott Hotel,
Niagara Falls), Liberal Club of Niagara Falls to LCBO, received September 18, 1935.
55 AO/LCBO, RG 36–8 (Lincoln Hotel, Port Dalhousie), telegraph from President of Port Dalhousie
Women’s Liberal Association, August 28, 1934.
56 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–738, Houck to Smith, August 4, 1936; April 7, 1937.
57 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–7–1529, E. J. Anderson to Odette, October 10, 1934.
58 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–716, Mayor to Odette, July 30, 1934.
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the attitude of Mr. Avery with regard to this application”, reciting the times
that Avery had supported the Board’s earlier decision. Indeed, Avery had
observed that “the probability that further issues [of authorities] would antag-
onize public opinion, and thereby imperil my status as Member”.59 The issue
became a hot topic in the city, with the St. Catharines Standard editorializing
that the government was granting authorities indiscriminately, just to make
money. The secretary of the Hotel Keepers Association of St. Catharines and
District chimed in, arguing that “to add to that number [of authorities] will
only stimulate the growing agitation to bring on a local option vote”.60 Exas-
perated, Smith wrote to Avery, in a letter marked personal and confidential,
that these protests mirrored his own views and that, “as it is not the policy to
mention anything about your desire in the matter, perhaps you can offset
things by notifying these people who are likely to protest that you are anxious
for the Hotel, and in that way, it might prevent some of the protests coming to
this office, as I certainly feel there are going to be plenty of them”.61 Smith
was politely telling Avery that, if the MPP wanted this authority to be granted
so badly, he would have to face the political pressure for the decision. It does
not appear that the hotel authority was granted.
More desperate — and, for Smith, frustrating — were the actions of Will-
iam Houck, who often wrote letters asking for special privileges. Most nota-
ble with respect to politics was his defence of an application at Crystal Beach
by a member of a notable family, the Teals. The situation was complex, not
least because Houck persisted in arguing for special consideration for the
Teals; it also involved the parochialism of the location, the political power
and vanity of local powers, and the importance of local political machines to
the party. This instance also illustrates well that, while Smith was willing to
be flexible, he was not willing to ignore the rules for simple political aspira-
tions of a politician.
Mrs. Teal owned a four-bedroom hotel and a restaurant in Crystal Beach, a
popular resort town at the south end of the Niagara Peninsula. Prior to 1935
she had received an authority for the restaurant, which had been granted in
error. When Smith discussed it with her, he agreed to allow her to have the
authority until the end of the year, but warned that she would lose it after that.
When she applied again in the spring of 1936, the LCBO immediately
rejected the application. Houck wrote to Smith, arguing that the Teal family
“command the greater majority of the electorate of Crystal Beach” and that
he would be in danger of losing his seat in the next election were their author-
ity not granted. He added that the community’s concern over Teal not receiv-
ing an authority was bolstered by the fact that a family named Sheehan, who
“are not held in very high esteem and furthermore they are not citizens”, had
59 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–614, Wylie to Smith, April 14, 1936.
60 St. Catharines Standard, May 19, 1936; AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–614, W. H. Brown to Smith, May
19, 1936.
61 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–614, Smith to Avery, May 20, 1936.
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received an authority. Smith was steadfast in his refusal to change the deci-
sion of the Board, despite repeated entreaties by Houck. After a few weeks of
persistent and increasingly desperate letters from Houck, Smith wrote a very
pointed letter to the MPP. After reminding Houck of the circumstances
around the denial of the authority, he noted that, instead of attempting to pro-
cure real hotel premises as Smith had suggested, Teal
did nothing along this line, contenting herself to merely decide that by kicking
up enough fuss, she could defy the Board and get a license for premises that
are absolutely nothing more nor less, than a fire trap and a disgrace as far as
carrying the label of a Hotel with an authority from the Liquor Control
Board..... [S]he merely sits back and says “I have a Restaurant and I demand
that it be called a Hotel and licensed as such.” ... From enquiries which I have
made into the vicinity, I do not think these people have nearly as much influ-
ence as you give them credit for having, and I do not believe it is right for a
person to sponor [sic] something that is not just and right.62
Smith did not waver in his opposition, despite Houck’s repeated requests. At
the end of June, the Board granted a temporary authority, conceding to sev-
eral pleas that Mrs. Teal was a widow and that losing her authority would
cause her considerable financial difficulty.63 Eventually the Teal family pur-
chased a nearby hotel, the Princess, for which they applied for an authority in
October and which they renamed Teal’s Hotel.64
Such conflicts between the priorities of the politicians and the ideals of the
bureaucrats suggest a strong sense among the LCBO administrators that they
needed to maintain a certain amount of distance from the political machina-
tions of local members of parliament. The situation of the Board administra-
tors was precarious, however. They still often sought input from politicians to
evaluate the suitability of a proprietor to hold an authority. Politicians could
and did endorse their own friends or party faithful. Yet the Board sought to
balance this reality with its own sense of moral legitimacy. When the propri-
etor of the New Stadtler Hotel in St. Catharines tried to muster political pres-
sure to have an authority passed, in spite of repeated arguments that there were
“sufficient authorities”, Inspector Wylie advised the Board to hold its ground.
If the Board should continue to hold to its present attitude of withholding the
Authority no harm is likely to come to the Liberal Party as a result, but if it
should happen that the Hotel be restored to its former status on the essential
nature of the appeals now being made, then I fear the re-action would be against
the Board.... I am, therefore, recommending with a knowledge of the circum-
stances, that so long as the restoration of this Authority be a matter of political
62 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–1501, Smith to Houck, June 19, 1936.
63 AO/LCBO RG 36–8 (Teal Hotel Files), Carl Teal to Smith, May 4, 1936; Smith to J. Teal, June 30,
1936.
64 AO/LCBO, RG 36–1–0–1501, Application forms (Princess Hotel file).
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concern that the Authority be withheld. That at least would disclose to the public
that the Board may not be intimidated where the conduct of Hotels is involved.65
The intimidation was political, from Liberal Party members. While appearing
to act on political motives would in turn potentially damage the authority of
the Board, Wylie argued, by standing their ground LCBO officials would
demonstrate the apolitical nature of the Board, thereby bolstering its moral
authority as an objective guarantor of public order.
Such interest in bolstering its own authority, of course, demonstrates an
inherent contradiction in the Board’s existence. Attempting to appear apolit-
ical was a political tactic, designed to enforce an image of the ideal-typical
bureaucracy that superseded politics. Such notions were central to the integrity
and persistence of the bureaucracy and to the notion of an enlightened, objec-
tive social regulator. By positioning itself as an apolitical, objective guardian
of public order, the Board reinforced its moral authority to regulate and shape
drinking behaviour to adhere to notions of middle-class respectability.
The operation of the LCBO in the Niagara Region suggests several pat-
terns of regulatory activity and illuminates the nature of the emerging bureau-
cracy. Established to rationalize the distribution and consumption of an
intensely problematic commodity, the LCBO attempted to impose a specific
notion of proper public behaviour on the population. In the post-prohibition
period, the LCBO had the opportunity to recast public drinking along lines
encouraging moderation and based upon a specific set of value assumptions
related to industriousness and the integrity of the family. This value system
reflected common conceptions of middle-class respectability and drew upon
pre-prohibition temperance values. The case of the LCBO’s work in Niagara,
then, suggests that the Board sought to impose a middle-class notion of
proper behaviour on the often working-class activity of public alcohol con-
sumption. By establishing a bureaucracy to regulate the drinking behaviour
of the community, the government created a regulatory regime in an attempt
to bring some sort of objective approach to hotel licensing that would break
with the patronage system of the past, while establishing powerful norms for
drinking for the future.
Any case study offers some answers and raises new questions. The rela-
tionship between the bureaucracy and members of parliament needs further
investigation. Was the Niagara case atypical? Did the bureaucrats have better
relationships and therefore were they less strict about enforcing certain rules
in other communities? Did other communities have priorities that overshad-
owed the family-centred focus that emerges in Niagara? Certainly the tourist
industry, especially around Niagara Falls, could skew the focus on the num-
ber of hotels and the type of activities that went on in them. Since each region
had different inspectors, what impact did the inspectors’ reports have on the
65 AO/LCBO, RG 36–8 (Harding Hotel file), Wylie memo to LCBO, April 5, 1937.
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way the Board regulated individual hotels? Such questions will be addressed
as the current project expands into investigating other communities. Mean-
while, however, evidence from the Niagara Region offers clear indications of
the role the LCBO saw itself playing in shaping the public drinking behav-
iour of a community, around notions of respectability based upon a persistent,
class-oriented value system.
